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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Cross-Appellant New Union Department of Environmental 
Protection (NUDEP) seeks review of the final decision of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Union issued 
on June 1, 2012.  (R. at 1).  This Court retains proper jurisdiction 
to hear appeals from final decisions of the district court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).  The district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case, as the underlying issues arose under 
the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(2006).  Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over 
questions of federal law.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I.  Whether the New Union Wildlife Federation (NUWF) has 
organizational standing under a traditional standing analysis 
where it can demonstrate that its individual members have 
suffered a concrete and particular injury through impaired 
enjoyment of the Muddy River fairly traceable to the Jim Bob 
Bowman’s (Bowman) conduct, and the injury is redressable by 
this Court. 
II.  Whether Bowman’s violation of Section 404 of the CWA 
was wholly in the past such that subject matter jurisdiction does 
not attach where Bowman ceased dredging the wetland before 
NUWF filed its lawsuit, there is no indication that he will restart 
any dredging activity, and he has already agreed to penalties for 
the prior actions. 
III.  Whether NUDEP’s calculated strategy to seek a consent 
decree and settlement agreement from Bowman constitutes 
diligent prosecution as to bar NUWF’s lawsuit where NUDEP 
exacted non-monetary penalties, courts accord deference to 
Agency enforcement, and NUWF had ample opportunity to 
intervene in the initial enforcement action. 
IV.  Whether Bowman’s movement of dirt and vegetation 
from one part of his wetland to another without a permit violates 
Section 404 of the CWA where the EPA’s definition and 
subsequent judicial interpretation of discharge of dredged and fill 
material incorporates clearing of wetlands for agricultural use. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/5
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order granting summary 
judgment in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Union on June 1, 2012.  (R. at 2).  NUWF challenged 
Bowman’s improper clearing and filling of his wetland without a 
permit under Sections 301(a) and 404 of the CWA on August 30, 
2011.  (R. at 4).  Prior to NUWF’s federal lawsuit, NUDEP used 
its discretion as the state agency charged with implementing the 
CWA to diligently prosecute Bowman for violations of the statute.  
(R. at 4).  NUDEP intervened in NUWF’s federal suit to ensure 
that its prior prosecution was accorded appropriate status by the 
court.  (R. at 4).  Pursuant to a finding that Bowman’s activities 
did not create an addition of fill material to his wetland, the 
district court granted Bowman’s summary judgment motion on 
all grounds.  (R. at 2). 
NUDEP appeals the lower court’s finding that NUWF lacked 
standing, arguing that the facts in the record demonstrate that 
NUWF’s individual members show an actual, concrete injury.  (R. 
at 1).  The lower court appropriately relied on the standard in 
Gwaltney to find that Bowman’s actions were wholly in the past 
prior to NUWF’s federal lawsuit; NUDEP respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the lower court’s decision as to subject 
matter jurisdiction.  (R. at 2).  NUDEP further asks this Court to 
affirm the lower court’s decision that NUDEP’s prior prosecution 
was procedurally and substantively diligent as to bar NUWF’s 
lawsuit.  (R. at 2).  Last, because the lower court did not accord 
proper deference to the EPA’s interpretation of dredge and fill 
material, NUDEP respectfully requests that this Court overturn 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for lack of a CWA 
Section 404 permit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 15, 2011, Bowman began clearing his wetland by 
pushing existing vegetation into artificial trenches without a 
permit.  (R. at 4).  He moved this uprooted vegetation and soil 
from one part of his land to another with a bulldozer when 
clearing it to plant wheat.  (R. at 4).  He excavated a wide ditch to 
3
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drain his newly-formed field into the Muddy River, to which his 
land is hydrologically connected.  (R. at 3-4).  Bowman completed 
all clearing and filling activities on approximately July 15, 2011.  
(R. at 4).  After learning of Bowman’s activities in July 2011, 
NUDEP, carrying out its authority to implement the CWA, sent 
Bowman a notice of violation of state and federal law.  (R. at 4).  
Bowman entered into a settlement agreement with NUDEP, 
consenting not to clear more wetland and granting a permanent 
conservation easement of land adjacent to the Muddy River.  (R. 
at 4).  NUDEP did not seek monetary penalties from Bowman, 
exercising its judgment as the agency charged with implementing 
the CWA.  (R. at 4). 
In addition to its settlement agreement, NUDEP brought suit 
against Bowman in federal court on August 10, 2011.  (R. at 5).  
NUWF, a non-profit organization whose mission is to protect the 
habitats of the State of New Union’s fish and wildlife, filed suit 
against Bowman in federal court on August 30, 2011, more than 
twenty days after NUDEP’s suit.  (R. at 4-5).  NUDEP waited 
approximately one month to file a motion to enter a consent 
decree, identical to the state settlement agreement previously 
agreed to by both NUDEP and Bowman.  (R. at 4-5).  NUDEP 
intervened in NUWF’s suit against Bowman to ensure that its 
previous administrative order and consent decree were accorded 
controlling status by the Court.  (R. at 5). 
In its suit against Bowman, three members of NUWF 
testified that they each use the Muddy River for recreational 
fishing and boating, and they picnic on its banks near Bowman’s 
land.  (R. at 6).  NUWF members stated that they feel a loss from 
the destruction of the wetlands, and are aware of differences in 
the River.  (R. at 6).  One member, Mr. Norton, can no longer find 
frogs in the cleared wetland.  (R. at 6).  Another testified that the 
River looks more polluted after Bowman’s decimation of the 
wetland.  (R. at 6).  In its suit against Bowman, NUWF is seeking 
monetary penalties and a court order requiring Bowman to 
restore the wetlands.  (R. at 5). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case comes before this Court on appeal from the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/5
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and. . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Questions of law are reviewed de novo 
by this Court.  Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557 (1988).  
This Court should therefore review Appellants’ claims de novo 
and afford no deference to the opinions and conclusions of the 
district court.  Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court improperly granted summary judgment for 
Bowman on the issues of NUWF’s standing and Bowman’s 
violation of CWA Section 404 and properly granted summary 
judgment on the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and diligent 
prosecution. 
The lower court misinterpreted the requirements of 
individual standing in Article III of the Constitution and 
Laidlaw.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs.(TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588 (D.S.C. 1997), aff’d, 528 U.S. 
167 (2000).  Instead, NUWF has standing to challenge Bowman’s 
filling of his wetlands without a permit under Section 404 
because it demonstrated a concrete and particularized injury for 
all of its testifying members.  The broad standing test, as 
elucidated by the Supreme Court in Laidlaw, is consistent with 
Congress’s intent in passing the CWA. 
The district court properly decided that Bowman’s filling of 
his wetlands was wholly in the past for the purposes of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Per the holding of Gwaltney, because 
Bowman came into compliance with NUDEP’s settlement 
agreement, and because NUDEP did not require the removal of 
dredged and fill materials, Bowman’s actions had ended before 
NUWF filed its federal lawsuit.  Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. 
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).  The continuing 
presence of dredged materials does not constitute a continuing 
violation under EPA regulations.  Because Bowman filled all of 
the wetland at issue, the single incident, wholly in the past, 
renders the lower court without subject matter jurisdiction. 
The lower court also correctly granted summary judgment for 
Bowman on diligent prosecution, as NUDEP’s settlement 
agreement and subsequent consent decrees were both 
substantively and procedurally diligent.  Because NUDEP is the 
state agency charged with implementing the CWA, it has broad 
5
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discretion to enforce the Act in the interests of public policy.  The 
lower court properly determined that NUDEP diligently 
prosecuted Bowman for his violation of the CWA. 
Finally, the district court improperly determined that 
Bowman’s activities did not require a Section 404 permit because 
it failed to consider, let alone give proper deference to, the EPA’s 
interpretation of the CWA.  The lower court incorrectly held that 
Bowman’s clearing and filling of the wetland did not constitute 
dredged material.  Courts consistently find landclearing activities 
like Bowman’s to be addition of a pollutant as either dredged or 
fill material.  Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 
897 (5th Cir. 1983).  Public policy also dictates that agencies, not 
the courts, are the proper entities to determine the character of 
the CWA violation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE NEW UNION WILDLIFE FEDERATION HAS 
ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING BECAUSE ITS 
MEMBERS MEET THE BROAD REQUIREMENTS 
OF TRADITIONAL INDIVIDUAL STANDING. 
Section II of Article III of the United States Constitution 
limits federal judicial power to cases and controversies.  U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2.  Every suit brought in federal court must meet 
the case or controversy minimum requirement.  Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  An organization may 
bring suit on behalf of its members if it can establish that at least 
one member would have individual standing, the organization’s 
interest in the suit is germane to its purpose, and individual 
member participation is unnecessary.  Hunt v. Wash. Apple 
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).  The Supreme Court 
has determined that an individual plaintiff must establish that 
he or she suffered an injury in fact which is (1) “(a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent,” (2) fairly traceable to 
the defendant’s actions, and (3) likely to be redressed by a 
favorable decision.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lujan was broadened in Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 
588 (D.S.C. 1997), aff’d, 528 U.S. 167 (2000), such that a plaintiff 
need not demonstrate actual or particular harm. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/5
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NUWF has organizational standing as it can establish that 
three of its individual members suffered an injury in fact fairly 
traceable to Bowman’s conduct that would be redressed by a 
favorable decision of this Court.  This Court should reverse the 
district court’s holding and find that NUWF meets the 
requirements of standing set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Laidlaw. 
A. NUWF Has Organizational Standing. 
NUWF can establish that it has organizational standing to 
bring suit against Bowman for violations of Sections 301(a) and 
404 of the CWA.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344 (2006).  There exists 
a strong presumption to grant standing, as the purpose of citizen 
suits are to protect and advance the public’s interest in pollution-
free waterways, not to promote private interests.  Penn. Envtl. 
Def. Found. v. Bellefonte Borough, 718 F. Supp. 431, 434 (M.D. 
Pa. 1989). 
The inquiry in the instant case into organizational standing 
centers on whether NUWF can offer sufficient evidence that “its 
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own 
right.”  Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.  Under the broad definition of 
injury in fact established by the Supreme Court in Laidlaw, 
NUWF can demonstrate that its individual members have 
individual standing.  (R. at 6).  NUWF’s mission statement and 
purpose is “to protect the fish and wildlife of the state by 
protecting their habitats.”  (R. at 4).  Its lawsuit against Bowman 
for violation of the CWA is therefore germane to its purpose.  
Last, no individual member need participate in the suit as the 
remedies requested do not require individualized proof and are 
properly resolved in a group context.  Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. 
B. NUWF Meets the Requirements of Individual 
Standing for Affiant Members. 
The standing provisions of Section 505 of the CWA authorize 
suit “against any person who is alleged to be in violation” by “any 
person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely 
affected.”  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1), (g) (2006).  The tripartite 
standing test articulated in Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. 
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 
7
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(1982), noted that Article III requires the party who invokes the 
court’s authority to show that he personally has suffered some 
actual legal or threatened injury.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Laidlaw established that “the relevant showing for purposes of 
Article III standing. . . is not injury to the environment but injury 
to the plaintiff.”  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.  NUWF’s individual 
members have a concrete and imminent “injury in fact” under the 
Laidlaw analysis, as demonstrated by testimony of conditional 
use of the Muddy River.  Similarly, NUWF sufficiently pled that 
the actual injury is fairly traceable to Bowman’s conduct and that 
the relief requested will redress the injuries.  (R. at 4).  The broad 
latitude afforded plaintiffs in establishing standing reflects the 
fact that the federal government and states lack the resources to 
enforce environmental law in every case, and as a result are able 
to enforce only the most egregious of violations.  See Jonathan H. 
Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and 
Environmental Protection, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 39, 44, 49 
(2001). 
1. NUWF’s three affiant members have an injury 
in fact that is concrete and imminent that 
confers standing upon the organization. 
The district court incorrectly determined that the affidavits 
of the three NUWF members did not demonstrate an injury in 
fact.  An injury can be a harm to aesthetic, recreational or 
environmental values and it need not be large – “identifiable 
trifle” will suffice.  United States v. Students Challenging Reg. 
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973).  To meet the 
Laidlaw standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she 
uses “the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic 
and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the 
challenged activity” and that these submissions of proof are more 
than mere “general averments” and “conclusory allegations.”  
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888).  A 
plaintiff’s affected interest becomes an injury when the threat to 
that interest is actual and imminent; intentions alone absent any 
kind of concrete plan to visit the area do not support a finding of 
actual or imminent injury.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.  There is 
no “particular formula for establishing a sufficient concrete and 
particularized aesthetic or recreational injury-in-fact.”  Ecological 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/5
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Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).  
As a result, in each case before it, the Court must determine 
whether the plaintiff’s interest in the area is factually based on 
the stated use or enjoyment of the affected waterway and 
whether that use would be lessened as a result of the defendant’s 
conduct.  Ecological Rights, 230 F.3d at 1141. 
Articulated in Laidlaw, a concrete and imminent injury need 
not reflect an injury to the environment.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 
157.  In Laidlaw, the affidavits and testimony presented by the 
plaintiffs asserted the existence of the defendant’s alleged 
discharges along with the affiant members’ reasonable concerns 
about the effects of those discharges.  Id.  Further, individual 
members of Friends of the Earth averred that the defendant’s 
probable discharges directly affected their recreational, aesthetic, 
and economic interests in the North Tyga River.  Id. at 169.  The 
injuries to the plaintiffs’ ability to recreationally use the river and 
its banks, as well as an aversion to the river’s smell and 
appearance satisfied the stricter requirements of Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife for concrete and particular pleadings.  Id. at 
183.  Taking these affirmations together, the Court found that 
individual members had established an injury in fact as to confer 
standing upon the umbrella organization.  Id. at 169.  The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the defendant’s discharges did 
no cognizable harm to the river even as it found that the 
plaintiffs’ injuries, which were based on a perceived harm to the 
river, merited standing.  Id. at 181.  The language of the Act itself 
requires only a violation and an interested party to produce a 
lawsuit.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).  Based on the Court’s analysis in 
Laidlaw, courts will grant standing when an entity allegedly 
violates the Act, and then the prospective plaintiff alters his or 
her behavior according to the simple belief that the waterway has 
suffered harm.  The belief itself, along with the alleged violation 
of the Act, confers upon plaintiffs an injury in fact that satisfies 
the Laidlaw standard. 
In the instant case, NUWF submitted three affidavits from 
its members which detailed a concrete connection to the allegedly 
polluted waterway and actual recreational use of it.  (R. at 6).  All 
individual members continually use “the Muddy for recreational 
boating and fishing, often picnicking on its banks, or in the 
vicinity of Bowman’s property.”  (R. at 6).  Each member is 
9
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further aware of differences in the River after Bowman cleared 
and filled the wetlands – they fear that it is more polluted and 
will become even more polluted if other wetlands along the river 
are cleared and filled for agricultural purposes.  (R. at 6).  One 
member specifically testified that the river looks more polluted 
now, after Bowman’s land was filled.  (R. at 6).  The concerns 
about the effects of Bowman’s actions and their effects on the 
Muddy River mirror those upon which the Supreme Court 
granted standing in Laidlaw.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 157.  
Following the Laidlaw analysis, NUWF’s members need not 
include any “hard data” to establish that the Muddy River is 
polluted, only their belief that it may be.  Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. 
at 588 (holding that the simple, genuine belief that the river was 
more polluted was sufficiently concrete to establish injury in fact).  
For standing, the Act itself requires only a violation and an 
interested plaintiff, not that the defendant’s behavior negatively 
impacts the plaintiff’s current or future use of the affected area.  
David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, 
and Other Contested Terms, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 79, 86 (2004).  
Through their conditional use of the area for recreational 
purposes and fear that the river is more polluted, NUWF 
members have established a concrete and actual injury per the 
requirements of Laidlaw. 
The lower court determined that Mr. Norton’s trespass upon 
Bowman’s land could not constitute an injury in fact.  However, 
case law suggests that inquiry into a plaintiff’s illegal behavior is 
improper in determining whether the standing requirements 
have been met.  See Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 
2d 1169, 1183 (D. Idaho 2001) (holding that the organization 
could bring its citizens suit because of the broader purpose of the 
CWA even if one or more of its members violated the CWA 
themselves).  The injury to Mr. Norton’s enjoyment of the affected 
waters can similarly meet the requirements of Laidlaw.  He 
testified that “there are no frogs in the drained field and he is 
lucky to find two or three good sized frogs in the remaining woods 
and buffer area.”  (R. at 6).  As a direct result of Bowman’s 
clearing and draining of the wetlands, Mr. Norton can no longer 
use the area for recreation.  While a NUDEP biologist testified 
that, once fully established, the buffer zone “will provide a higher 
quality habitat, and more of it, for frogs,” Mr. Norton has still 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/5
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suffered an injury to his current and future enjoyment of the 
Muddy River.  (R. at 6).  As Laidlaw noted, for standing, the 
injury demonstrated must be to the plaintiff, not the 
environment.  Certainly, Mr. Norton’s ability to enjoy the River 
and adjacent land has been lessened by Bowman’s decimation of 
the wetland. 
2. The injuries sustained by NUWF members are 
fairly traceable to Bowman’s conduct and are 
redressable by this Court. 
To meet the second prong of the standing test under Laidlaw, 
plaintiffs need only show that the defendant’s violations 
contributed to their injury.  Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J. v. 
Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990).  As 
expressed in Powell Duffryn, plaintiffs need not show “to a 
scientific certainty” that the pollution perceived in the waterway 
comes from the defendant.  Id. at 73 n.10. 
The Fifth Circuit similarly found a fairly traceable injury 
where an organization alleged that the defendant lacked a 
permit, such that any discharge would violate the CWA, and the 
discharges occurring were typical of those which harm water 
quality and marine life.  Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar 
Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996).  NUWF members 
affirmed that they were aware that wetlands serve valuable 
functions in maintaining integrity of rivers.  (R. at 6).  NUWF’s 
submitted affidavits included statements that the “Muddy looks 
more polluted. . . than it did prior to Bowman’s activities.”  (R. at 
6).  This statement detailing the effects of the filling of Bowman’s 
wetlands, typical of harmful discharge, satisfies the requirements 
of the Fifth Circuit for the second prong of the standing test. 
Similarly, that there were significantly fewer frogs in the 
area demonstrates that Bowman’s clearing and filling of his land 
is directly traceable to the injury alleged.  (R. at 6).  As to proof of 
causation, “rather than pinpointing the origins or particular 
molecules, a plaintiff must merely show that a defendant. . . 
causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged in the 
specific geographic area of concern.”  Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2000).  Both the 
Ninth and Third Circuits agree that the causal connection need 
not be so airtight in establishing standing as to demonstrate that 
11
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the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits, only that there exists a 
substantial likelihood that the defendant’s conduct caused the 
plaintiff’s harm.  Id.; see also Powell Duffryn, 913 F.3d at 72. 
To satisfy the last prong of the standing requirement – 
redressability – courts only require that the kind of damages 
sought will address the specific harms endured.  An injunction to 
restore the wetlands or civil penalties, as sought by NUWF, 
would satisfy the redressability requirement for constitutional 
standing.  Sw. Marine, 236 F.3d at 995.  Civil penalties may 
further redress the injury suffered by a plaintiff if they will serve 
as a deterrent to future polluting.  Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 73.  
If the penalties sought are imposed upon Bowman, other would-
be polluters along the Muddy River may think twice about filling 
their wetlands. 
C. Congress’s Intent in Including a Citizen Suit 
Provision in the Clean Water Act Is Best 
Honored by Granting Standing to NUWF. 
The disposition of the instant case will implicate not only the 
standing doctrine itself, but that of general environmental 
protection as well.  Congress passed the CWA with the intent to 
provide protection for the nation’s waterways from pollution.  
Within the Act itself, Congress intended to eliminate as many 
barriers to citizen standing as possible as it charged private 
citizens with acting as private attorneys general when 
enforcement agencies would or could not.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.  
Congress often includes citizen suits or similar enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure that its broad goals are met.  See Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a 
Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 Duke L.J. 
1170, 1195 (1993).  The inherent narrowness of the Supreme 
Court’s current standing doctrine has a significant effect upon 
who may sue: this fact causes an asymmetry in the cases the 
courts do hear as the doctrine admits regulated entities easily, 
while regulatory beneficiaries who bring citizen suits to enforce 
the Act are more likely to lack standing.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
561-62 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984) (“when 
the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or 
inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is 
ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish”). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/5
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Were this Court to deny standing to NUWF, it would 
disregard Congress’s intent in granting citizens the ability to sue.  
Because the CWA itself only requires interested parties and a 
violation, granting standing in the instant case furthers this 
broad policy goal of private involvement in environmental 
protection.  Ensuring that those non-regulated entities have 
access to the courts acknowledges Congress’s goals as well as 
protects the future of the standing doctrine: “there are certain 
kinds of cases in which the doctrine may be impossible to satisfy 
and yet we believe access to the courts is desirable[,]” such as 
suits directly involving the interests of future generations.  
Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 
91 B.U. L. Rev. 159, 181 (2011).  Vigorous enforcement of the 
CWA will likely deter similar undesirable activities, thereby 
protecting the system from future threats.  For these reasons, 
this Court should reverse the district court’s holding and find 
that NUWF has organizational standing. 
II. THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION UNDER CLEAN WATER ACT 
SECTION 505 BECAUSE BOWMAN’S ACTIONS DO 
NOT CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING VIOLATION. 
Section 505(a) of the CWA provides authority for citizen suits 
and gives courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases 
involving violations of the Act.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).  To bring suit 
under Section 505(a), a defendant must be “alleged to be in 
violation of an effluent standard or limitation” of the CWA.  Id.  
The Supreme Court has ruled that the language of Section 505(a) 
requires that for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction, 
violations must be alleged to be continuous or intermittent at the 
time the suit is brought, and cannot have been completed wholly 
in the past.  Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay 
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).  There are no competing 
interpretations of the plain-language meaning of “continuous” nor 
does NUWF argue in the instant case that the material 
constitutes an intermittent violation of the Act.  Because of the 
statute’s legislative history and continued judicial deference to 
Agency orders, courts will have subject matter jurisdiction only 
for present and future violations of the Act. 
13
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The Supreme Court’s ruling in Gwaltney is the measure for 
district courts to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction 
attaches to a violation of CWA Section 404.  District courts have 
clarified that CWA Section 404 violations are not considered 
continuing after a party comes into compliance with Agency 
orders, if the removal of dredged and fill materials has not been 
ordered.  Orange Env’t, Inc., v. Cnty. of Orange, 923 F. Supp. 529 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
The district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
because Bowman was already in compliance with the prior 
Agency order, per the requirements of Gwaltney, at the time that 
NUWF filed its lawsuit.  NUWF incorrectly argues that 
continuing CWA Section 404 violations should be held to a 
different and higher standard than continuing violations of CWA 
Section 402.  (R. at 7).  Yet, this proposition is unsupported by 
case law, statute or legislative intent.  This Court should affirm 
the district court’s holding that Bowman’s activities did not meet 
the necessary threshold for subject matter jurisdiction based on 
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)’s requirement that a violation be continuous 
or intermittent. 
A. Bowman’s Violation of Clean Water Act Section 
404 Was Wholly in the Past Before NUWF Filed 
Suit. 
In Gwaltney, appellees claimed that CWA Section 505(a) 
gives authority to citizens to seek relief even when these 
violations were “wholly past” and have little chance of recurrence. 
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 55.  In its decision, the Court held that 
violations of Section 505(a) must be continuous or intermittent for 
subject matter jurisdiction to attach.  Id.  Looking first to the 
language of the statute, the Gwaltney Court found that, while 
somewhat ambiguous, “[t]he most natural reading of ‘to be in 
violation’ is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of 
either continuous or intermittent violation.”  Id. at 57.  
“Congress,” it continued, “could have phrased its requirement in 
language that looked to the past (‘to have violated’), but it did not 
choose this readily available option.”  Id.  The Court also found 
that as other sections of the Act, such as Section 309(d), 
purposely use the past tense to cover previous events, the will of 
Congress was that Section 404 violations must be current for 
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courts to have subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 57-59.  It further 
ruled that Congressional history demonstrated that the language 
was specifically chosen for Section 505 to encompass present and 
future violations.  Id. at 50.  Legislative history provided that 
citizen suits are “not [intended] to remedy wholly past violations.” 
Id. 
Bowman’s violation of CWA Section 404 was wholly in the 
past before NUWF filed suit against him on August 30, 2011, as 
he had ceased dredging the wetland on his property by July 15, 
2011.  (R. at 4).  Bowman’s activities are not continuous, as his 
landclearing activities were interrupted on July 15, 2011, when 
he ceased clearing his wetland.  (R. at 4).  Neither are his 
activities intermittent as there is no reason to believe, and 
NUWF does not assert, that he plans to restart his dredging 
activities in the future.  Extending the Gwaltney reasoning, a 
single, discrete incident in the past would not grant courts subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Likewise, Bowman’s single violation of the 
CWA does not constitute a continuing or intermittent violation.  
Bowman, after being provided notice, ceased his violations of 
Section 404 and agreed with NUDEP’s proposal for remedy.  (R. 
at 4-5).  Therefore, by August 30, 2011, when NUWF filed its 
lawsuit, Bowman’s actions were wholly in the past.  (R. at 5). 
NUWF argues that the CWA Section 402 violations and 
dredged or fill material covered under Section 404 must be 
treated differently.  (R. at 7).  The Gwaltney Court does not 
distinguish between the types of effluence in each section, but 
instead repeatedly looks to the language of the Act for guidance.  
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59-62.  While NUWF argues for a 
delineation between Section 402 effluence and Section 404 
dredged or fill materials, the Court in Gwaltney rightly did not 
make such a distinction.  Id.  As the district court states, “many § 
402 violations involve the discharge of solids or sediment which 
settle on the water bottom below or shortly downstream from the 
outfall and can be removed.”  (R. at 7).  Therefore, not only is 
NUWF’s argument contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court, it 
offends logic and public policy to suggest that depositing Section 
404 materials into a water is a continuing violation until they are 
removed, while releasing Section 402 effluence should be 
considered a wholly past offense even when it is removed just as 
easily.  (R. at 7). 
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B. Granting Subject Matter Jurisdiction Would 
Usurp the Right of the State Agency to Act in the 
Best Interests of All Citizens. 
The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the notice 
provision in the CWA is to give an alleged violator the 
opportunity to come into compliance with the Act and to allow the 
Administrator or the State to follow up with actions.  Gwaltney, 
484 U.S. at 60-61.  Construing the notice provision, the Gwaltney 
Court reasoned that the purpose of giving sixty days notice before 
filing a suit, not only to the State and Administrator, but the 
alleged violator as well, was to allow the violator the opportunity 
to come into compliance with the Act.  Id.  It would “render 
incomprehensible § 505’s notice provision” if citizen suits could 
“target wholly past violations.”  Id. at 59-60.  The Court found 
that “the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in 
the present or the future, not the past,” therefore, suits brought 
after an Administrator had assessed penalties, would curtail 
agency “discretion to enforce the Act in the public interest.”  Id. at 
59-61.  Curtailing the notice provision would have the effect of 
changing “the nature of the citizens’ role from interstitial to 
potentially intrusive.”  Id. at 61. 
It is uncontroverted that Bowman ceased his landclearing 
activities on July 15, 2011, after NUWF issued notice to him on 
July 1, 2011, and before it filed its federal lawsuit on August 30, 
2011.  (R. at 4-5).  Furthermore, because NUDEP exacted 
penalties from Bowman in the form of developing and 
maintaining a new artificial wetland, giving the State a 
conservation easement for public use, and a restriction from 
developing these areas in any way, giving the Court subject 
matter jurisdiction would remove the Agency’s ability to enforce 
the CWA in the public interest, per Gwaltney.  Gwaltney, 484 
U.S. at 61. 
NUWF erroneously relies on Sasser v. Administrator, 990 
F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993) because the Fourth Circuit held that 
each day Section 404 dredged and fill material “remains in the 
wetlands without a permit constitutes an additional day of 
violation.”  In ruling against the landowner in Sasser, the court 
noted that not only had the violations been ongoing, but that 
there had been no effort to work with the EPA or the Army Corp 
of Engineers despite repeated notices and citations.  Id at 128.  
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The court’s holding that the violation was continuous was only in 
the context of the landowner’s refusal to work with the EPA, who 
had demanded that the deposited materials be removed.  Id. at 
129.  Unlike NUWF, the EPA in Sasser was not bringing a citizen 
suit, but was instead enforcing the issuance of an order under 33 
U.S.C. § 1311, due to the plaintiff’s repeated refusal to come into 
compliance with the CWA.  Id. at 128. 
On August 10, 2011, after receiving notice from NUWF, 
NUDEP stepped in to resolve Bowman’s violations.  (R. at 5).  An 
agreement was reached that will effectively recreate a wetland 
while enhancing public recreation.  (R. at 5).  According deference 
to Agency orders ensures that citizen-suits will not usurp the 
state’s authority to work toward the public good.  This Court 
should accord the Agency deference and recognize the finality of 
its orders by not extending subject matter jurisdiction. 
III. THE NEW UNION DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION’S PROCEDURAL 
AND SUBSTANTIVE DILIGENT PROSECUTION 
BARS THE NEW UNION WILDLIFE FEDERATION’S 
CITIZEN SUIT. 
Under the CWA, even when a citizen has standing, the 
citizen’s lawsuit will be barred if the state diligently prosecutes 
the alleged CWA violations.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2006).  
Section 505 of the CWA states in pertinent part that no citizen 
suit may be commenced if the “Administrator or State has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action 
in a court of the United States” provided that citizens have the 
opportunity to intervene in such suit.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
concisely restated this requirement in Gwaltney, when it stated 
that “citizen suits are proper only if the Federal, State, and local 
agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility.” 
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.  NUDEP’s settlement agreement with 
Bowman, the resulting administrative order, and NUDEP’s 
subsequent federal lawsuit constitute diligent prosecution, 
barring NUWF’s citizen suit. 
A. NUDEP’s Consent Decree and Settlement 
Agreement Lack Procedural Defects and Should 
Be Afforded Considerable Deference by the 
17
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Court. 
While it is true that an agency’s consent decree must 
demonstrate actual diligence in prosecution, citizens “bear the 
burden of proving the state agency’s prosecution was not diligent.  
This burden is a heavy one because diligence on the part of the 
enforcement agency is presumed.”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. (Laidlaw I), 890 F. 
Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995).  This presumption, especially for consent 
agreements, stems from the agency’s unique position to consider 
the best solution for all interested parties, not just potential 
plaintiffs.  Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 
1140, 1147 (E.D. Ark. 1993), aff’d, 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 Courts recognize settlement agreements and consent 
decrees as procedurally acceptable methods of diligent 
prosecution.  The Supreme Court recognized that “if citizens 
could file suit. . . in order to seek the civil penalties that the 
Administrator chose to forgo, then the Administrator’s discretion 
to enforce the Act in the public interest would be curtailed 
considerably.”  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61.  The Tenth Circuit 
explained that while requiring diligence, “Section 1365(b)(1)(B) 
[of the CWA] does not require government prosecution to be far-
reaching or zealous. . . Nor must an agency’s prosecutorial 
strategy coincide with that of the citizen-plaintiff.”  Karr v. 
Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007).  Courts defer to 
Agency judgment when negotiating consent decrees because if 
defendants are “exposed to a citizen suit whenever the EPA 
grants it a concession, defendants will have little incentive to 
negotiate consent decrees.”  Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197.  The Eighth 
Circuit followed the same reasoning when it stated that “[i]t 
would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find failure to 
diligently prosecute simply because [defendants] prevailed in 
some fashion or because a compromise was reached.”  Ark. 
Wildlife Fed’n., 29 F.3d at 380.  Furthermore, failing to defer to 
an agency’s judgment in assessing proper remedies undermines 
Congress’s intent in balancing power in the CWA between the 
States, private citizens and agencies, which permits citizens to 
act only when the agency has failed to do so.  Ellis v. Gallatin 
Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 477 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 NUDEP’s settlement was procedurally distinguishable from 
the rejected settlement in Laidlaw I because it offered the 
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opportunity for citizen intervention within the meaning of CWA 
Section 505.  The court in Laidlaw I explained that the main 
procedural defect was “the absence of a meaningful opportunity 
for the citizen plaintiffs to intervene in this case” which 
“trigger[ed] a heightened scrutiny into the settlement.”  Laidlaw 
I, 890 F. Supp. at 489-90.  In Laidlaw I, the agency filed its 
settlement only one day after filing its lawsuit, foreclosing any 
opportunity for citizens to intervene.  Id.  The Laidlaw I court 
further noted that “the complaint was filed at the [d]efendant’s 
request, solely to accommodate the [d]efendant’s desire to bar a 
citizen suit” and the defendant “drafted the state-court complaint 
and settlement agreement, filed the lawsuit against itself, and 
paid the filing fee.  And finally the settlement agreement between 
[the agency] and [defendant] was entered into with unusual 
haste, without giving the [p]laintiffs the opportunity to 
intervene.”  Id. at 489.  NUWF cannot claim any type of 
procedural defect found in the Laidlaw I settlement.  Rather than 
attempt to intervene in NUDEP’s suit, NUWF brought its own 
action twenty days later.  (R. at 5).  Unlike the Agency in Laidlaw 
I, NUDEP waited nearly one month before filing its motion to 
enter the consent decree.  (R. at 5).  The proposed consent decree 
embodied a compromise diligently reached between NUDEP and 
Bowman.  (R. at 4).  The fact that the agreement mirrored the 
state lawsuit agreement simply reflects the fact that the state 
statute mirrors the CWA.  (R. at 4).  To overturn the district 
court’s diligence finding based on the sameness of the statutes 
and their settlement terms would fashion a new rule which would 
result in the absurd requirement that parties rehash identical 
negotiations for identical statutes merely because the violations 
are now brought before a federal court. 
B. NUDEP’s Actions Culminating in its Federal 
Lawsuit and the Proposed Consent Decree 
Constitute Substantive Diligent Prosecution. 
Besides procedural considerations, courts look to the 
substance of consent decrees to determine if the presumption of 
diligence has been rebutted.  Laidlaw I, 890 F. Supp. at 490.  The 
Laidlaw I court discussed two non-dispositive factors to consider 
when deciding whether a consent decree is substantively diligent: 
“a state’s failure to enforce its consent order” and “lack of 
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substantial relief.”  Id.  The court held that these factors must be 
“viewed in light of all of the circumstances.”  Id. at 491.  In 
considering all the circumstances, the court noted the deficiencies 
alleged: (1) only requiring the defendant’s best effort to comply 
with its permits, (2) lack of stipulated penalties for future 
violations, (3) lack of liability for any violations occurring during 
the order’s time while extending that time indefinitely into the 
future, and (4) an overall lenient penalty.  Id. at 490-91.  In 
fashioning remedies, agencies should consider the defendant’s 
economic benefits from his non-compliance; however, the failure 
to consider such benefits alone does not support a finding of non-
diligent prosecution.  Sierra Club v. ICG E., LLC, 833 F. Supp. 2d 
571, 579 (N.D. W. Va. 2011) (clarifying the holding in Laidlaw I, 
890 F. Supp. at 499). 
 While the severity of a penalty is one non-dispositive factor, 
the Seventh Circuit explained that courts examine penalties for 
future deterrent effect but do not require monetary penalties 
when remedial penalties suffice.  Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. 
Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 762-63 (7th Cir. 
2004).  The Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers court stated, “[w]e 
agree with the First Circuit that ‘[d]uplicative actions aimed at 
exacting financial penalties in the name of environmental 
protection at a time when remedial measures are well underway 
do not further [the goals of the Clean Water Act].  They are, in 
fact, impediments to environmental remedy efforts.’”  Id. (citing 
N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 558 (1st 
Cir. 1991).  Thus, if courts were to require monetary penalties, 
agencies’ delegated powers would be usurped in determining the 
appropriate remedy to fulfill the goals of the CWA. 
 There are no allegations that NUDEP’s proposed consent 
decree has any of the glaring substantive deficiencies found in 
Laidlaw I, nor are there allegations that the decree attempts to 
remove this Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the order.  (R. at 4).  
NUWF does not suggest that NUDEP will fail to enforce the 
agreement.  (R. at 4).  Furthermore, NUDEP effectively obtained 
an injunction requiring Bowman to cease and desist all clearing 
activities and there are no allegations that the consent decree 
granted Bowman any immunity from liability for future 
violations.  (R. at 4).  Finally, while NUDEP did not seek 
monetary penalties, it carefully considered the circumstances and 
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determined that the most appropriate remedy would be obtained 
by seeking substantial non-monetary penalties.  (R. at 4).  
Bowman was required to actually cede control of a portion of his 
land, granting a conservation easement open to the public, and 
permanently stripping him of all development rights to it.  (R. at 
3-4).  While only a small percentage of his land by acreage, this 
concession was on prime river front acreage which he planned to 
clear and use.  (R. at 3-4).  This concession removes one of the 
property sticks from Bowman’s bundle and is likely to 
permanently affect his land’s resale value.  Bowman was also 
required to improve some of his remaining land by constructing 
at his cost a year-round wetland.  (R. at 3-4).  These non-
monetary penalties will actually benefit the NUWF members and 
the public at large, demonstrating that NUDEP considered the 
interests of all parties per its role as primary enforcer of the 
CWA.  Testimony from NUDEP’s biologist established that “the 
new, year-round, partially-inundated wetland in the buffer zone 
will provide richer wetland habitat than the former, occasionally-
inundated wetland.”  (R. at 6).  The easement will allow NUWF 
members to legally continue their frogging.  (R. at 8).  The district 
court also found that the “easement shields the field from the 
river, so that the aesthetics of navigational use of the river is 
unaffected.”  (R. at 6).  In short, NUDEP has chosen to seek 
remedial penalties and NUWF has not overcome its heavy burden 
to rebut the presumption of NUDEP’s diligence negotiating the 
administrative order and proposed consent decree. 
IV. BOWMAN’S DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS IN A 
WETLAND WITHOUT A PERMIT VIOLATED 
CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404. 
The CWA clearly states that “the discharge of any pollutant 
by any person shall be unlawful.”  33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  The CWA 
defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from a point source.”  33 U.S.C. § 
1362(12) (2006).  The CWA then defines pollutant as “dredged 
spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage. . ., 
chemical wastes, biological materials. . ., rock, sand, cellar dirt 
and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into 
water.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).  The government “may issue 
permits. . . for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
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navigable waters. . . and is authorized to enforce “[v]iolations of 
permits.”  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (s) (2006). 
The EPA has defined the terms of 33 U.S.C. § 1344 to 
differentiate between dredged and fill materials in 33 C.F.R. § 
323.2.  In the instant case, Bowman does not dispute that he used 
a bulldozer as a point source to clear a wetland and that he did 
not first obtain a permit for the activities.  (R. at 8, 9).  Nor has 
NUDEP’s authority to prosecute violations of the CWA been 
questioned.  (R. at 4).  At issue is whether Bowman’s activities 
meet the requirements for the EPA’s interpretation of addition of 
dredged material, which is defined to include the redeposit of said 
materials.  Furthermore, even if this Court decides that the 
substances constituted fill material, case law repeatedly defines 
actions such as Bowman’s to fall within the definition for the 
addition of a pollutant as a violation of Section 404. 
A. Bowman Violated the CWA by Redepositing 
Dredged Materials into a Wetland without a 
Section 404 Permit. 
For the purposes of enforcing the CWA, the EPA has stated 
that “dredged material means material that is excavated or 
dredged from waters of the United States.”  33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c).  
The EPA’s definition for “discharge of dredged material” is “any 
addition of dredged material into, including the redeposit of 
dredged material other than incidental fallback within, the 
waters of the United States.”  33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1).  The EPA 
specifically includes “excavated material. . . which is incidental to 
any activity, including mechanized landclearing, ditching, 
channelization, or other excavation.”  33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii). 
1. EPA regulations define the materials 
Bowman redeposited into the wetland as 
dredged material. 
To emphasize that mechanized landclearing constitutes 
dredging, Section 323.2 further states that “[a]ctivities that 
involve only the cutting or removing of vegetation above the 
ground (e.g., mowing, rotary cutting, and chainsawing)” and 
where these activities do not disturb “the root system nor involves 
mechanized pushing, dragging, or other similar activities that 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/5
  
2013] BEST BRIEF: CROSS-APELLANT 137 
redeposit excavated soil material” shall not be considered 
dredging.  33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(ii).  Therefore, a wetland is 
dredged by a landclearing machine used to disturb vegetation 
below the ground surface. 
Bowman and the district court contend that the excavated – 
and subsequently redeposited material – constituted fill material, 
rather than dredged material, and is therefore not subject to the 
“redeposit” definition of 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1).  The district court 
defines the verb “dredge” as “an activity that occurs on open 
water to excavate a channel or port docking area to make them 
available for commercial navigation.”  (R. at 8).  However, this is 
merely one narrow meaning of the word “dredge” and the district 
court ignored both the EPA’s definition and the plain meaning of 
the term.  The definition of “dredge” as a verb is “to dig, gather, or 
pull out with or as if with a dredge.”  Webster’s Unabridged 
Dictionary 595 (2d ed. 1999).  Furthermore, Section 
323.2(d)(1)(iii) provides “dredge” with a clearly different meaning 
than the district court when it includes the term “landclearing” as 
a method of adding or redepositing dredged material.  The district 
court ignored both the plain meaning and the EPA’s own 
interpretation of the definition for “dredged material” by 
expanding the word “dredge” beyond its dictionary definition and 
clear meaning in the EPA’s regulations. 
2. Bowman violated the CWA when he 
redeposited the dredged material into the 
wetland. 
 The EPA defines the addition of “dredged material” to 
include redeposit of excavated soil and vegetation.  33 C.F.R. § 
323.2(d)(1)(iii).  Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit concluded in 
Avoyelles that by using a bulldozer to clear a wetland of 
vegetation and depositing the resulting debris into sloughs, the 
landowners had redeposited either fill or dredged materials in 
violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1344.  Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. 
v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th Cir. 1983).  The Avoyelles court 
also held that “the term ‘discharge’ covers the redepositing of 
materials taken from the wetlands.”  Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 923.  
The Fourth Circuit agrees with this analysis in United States v. 
Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2000), when it states that 
once a material is excavated from a wetland, the resulting dirt 
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and vegetation becomes dredged spoil upon its redeposit into 
navigable waters due to its harmful effect on the environment.  
The Court’s ruling is bolstered by EPA regulations which state 
that exemption from CWA permit requirements do not include 
“mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization and other 
excavation activity in a water of the United States, which would 
result in a redeposit of dredged material.”  33 C.F.R. § 
323.2(d)(3)(i).  The Eleventh Circuit similarly held that dredging 
by tugboat propellers which “redeposit[ed] the vegetation and 
sediment on the adjacent sea grass beds” and “cut into the 
bottom, uprooting and destroying the sea grass” constituted 
addition of a pollutant in violation of the CWA.  United States v. 
M.C.C. of Fl., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985), 
vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987). 
 As explained by the EPA and courts, addition of dredged 
material includes its redeposit.  Bowman’s activities are precisely 
the kind of landclearing activities defined by the EPA to 
constitute addition in 33 C.F.R. § 323.2.  The district court 
supplanted its judgment for the EPA’s definition of “dredged 
material” when it stated, “[l]and clearing is not dredging, so we 
have no dredged spoil to discharge here” and provided no 
authority for its revised definition.  (R. at 8). 
 When a court reviews an agency’s interpretation of its own 
statute, the court first looks to see “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress 
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  However, “if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. at 843.  Here, 
“[n]either the CWA nor the legislative history addresses the 
precise question of what constitutes a ‘discharge of dredged 
material’ in wetlands” or landclearing activities.  William S. 
Pufko, The Revised Definition of “Discharge of Dredged Material”: 
Its Legality, Practicality, and Impact on Wetlands Protection, 9 
Envtl. Law. 187, 226 (2002).  Because Section 404 is ambiguous, 
Chevron analysis proceeds to the second step.  The EPA’s 
promulgated rule defining dredged material to include redeposit 
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from landclearing activities is “is based on sound science and ‘the 
nature of earth-moving equipment.’”  Id. at 228.  The EPA made 
this conclusion “[i]n light of the broad policy goals of the CWA 
and the agencies’ expertise, their interpretation warrants 
deference as a reasonable interpretation of their section 404 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 228-29.  Yet, the district court failed to give 
the proper deference to the EPA’s regulatory interpretation. 
 As the district court has found that Bowman performed 
mechanized landclearing to remove live vegetation from above 
and below the surface of lands that were properly designated as 
wetlands, the material that Bowman created is defined as 
“dredged material” by the EPA, not fill material.  (R. at 8, 9); 33 
C.F.R. § 323.2.  Bowman destroyed the wetland on his property in 
order to create arable farmland for the production of wheat 
without first obtaining a permit.  (R. at 4).  Therefore, NUDEP 
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the lower court 
and find that Bowman be found in violation of Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act. 
B. Bowman’s Activities Would Still Violate CWA 
Section 404’s Addition Requirement if 
Considered Fill Material. 
 The CWA prohibits the “addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters from any point source,” but the CWA does not 
define “addition.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).  However, the EPA does 
define “addition” in its regulations, contrary to the district court’s 
opinion.  (R. at 9).  As explained above, Bowman’s material 
clearly fits the definition of addition of “dredged material” as 
defined in 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d).  Even if this Court were to 
consider the Bowman material to be fill material under 33 C.F.R. 
§ 323.2(e), Bowman’s actions still constitute “addition.” 
 Fill material is defined as “material placed in waters of the 
United States where the material has the effect of: (i) Replacing 
any portion of a water of the United States with dry land; or (ii) 
Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the 
United States.”  33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1).  Addition of fill material 
is defined to “generally include[], without limitation. . . site-
development fills for recreational, industrial, commercial, 
residential, or other uses.”  33 C.F.R. 323.2(f) (emphasis added).  
Bowman’s fill of the wetland for commercial agricultural use 
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clearly falls within the meaning of the Agency’s definition of 
addition of fill material. 
1. Courts have consistently interpreted 
activities like Bowman’s to fall within the 
CWA’s meaning of addition of “fill material.” 
 The district court incorrectly interpreted the Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n v. Gorsuch case, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), to create a 
hard and fast “from the outside world” rule for the addition of fill 
material.  (R. at 9).  However, the Gorsuch court did not actually 
rule on the meaning of the term “addition.”  Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 
175.  The Gorsuch case merely deferred to the EPA’s 
interpretation of “addition” in relation to the specific facts of that 
case, stating that the “EPA’s interpretation must be accepted 
unless manifestly unreasonable.”  Id.  Incorporating EPA-
promulgated definitions of addition of fill material in 33 C.F.R. § 
323.2(f), courts have consistently recognized the meaning of 
“addition” to include activities such as Bowman’s. 
 In Avoyelles, the defendant owned a forested tract of land 
within a seasonably flooded river basin, eighty percent of which 
was determined to be wetland.  Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 901, 903.  
The defendant decided to clear the land for agricultural use and 
used “bulldozers. . . [to] cut the timber and vegetation at or just 
above ground level.  The trees were then raked into windrows, 
burned, and the stumps and ashes were disced into the ground,” 
leveling the tract.  Id. at 901, 923.  The landowner also created a 
drainage ditch.  Id.  The court held “that the landowners were 
discharging ‘fill material’ into the wetlands” without a permit, in 
violation of CWA Section 404.  Id. at 925.  The court based its 
determination on 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 to find that the clearing and 
leveling “chang[ed] the bottom elevation of the waterbody,” and 
“replaced the aquatic area with dry land” and was in effect the 
addition of fill material.  Id. at 924-25. 
 The Supreme Court and other appeals courts have 
similarly rejected the “outside world” theory that the district 
court used.  In Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 537 U.S. 99 (2002), the 
Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s decision when the 
defendant sought to convert wetlands into orchards and 
vineyards without a CWA Section 404 permit.  Id. at 812.  The 
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Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that an activity was not 
“the ‘addition’ of a ‘pollutant’ into wetlands, because it simply 
churns up soil that is already there, placing it back basically 
where it came from.”  Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d. at 814.  It held 
that the argument was inconsistent with prior precedent from the 
Ninth and other circuits “that squarely hold that redeposits of 
materials can constitute an ‘addition of a pollutant’ under the 
Clean Water Act.”  Id. at 814. 
 The Seventh Circuit recently agreed that the outside world 
concept would not be “compatible with the purpose of the CWA to 
‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.’”  Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. 
Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 948-49 (7th Cir. 2004).  That court went 
on to say “it is logical to believe that soil and vegetation removed 
from one part of a wetland or waterway and deposited in another 
[contiguous or adjacent] could disturb the ecological balance of 
the affected areas – both the area from which the material was 
removed and the area on which the material was deposited.”  
Greenfield Mills, 361 F.3d at 948-49. 
 The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 
331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000), explained that the CWA “does not 
prohibit the addition of material; it prohibits the ‘addition of any 
pollutant.’”  The court found it quite obvious that “there could be 
an addition of a pollutant without an addition of material. . . at 
least when an activity transforms some material from a 
nonpollutant into a pollutant.”  Deaton, 209 F.3d at 335.  The 
court then pointed out that the earth and vegetable matter that 
was removed from the wetland became “a statutory pollutant and 
a type of material that up until then was not present on the 
[defendants’] property.”  Id. at 335.  The court recognized the 
important difference between soil and vegetation in its natural 
state and in its disturbed state when it held that “[i]t is of no 
consequence that what is now [a statutory pollutant] was 
previously present on the same property in the less threatening 
form.”  Id. at 335-36.  The court then went on to find that the 
defendant had “added a pollutant where none had been before.”  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 The district court ignores both EPA regulations and prior 
judicial precedent when it calls the distinction in Deaton an 
“imaginative piece of verbal metaphysics [which] only masks 
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reality.”  (R. at 10).  The district court cites Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988), and the 
EPA’s unitary navigable water theory, to argue that it does not 
“matter that the defendant’s actions changed the nature of some 
of the material from living to dead.”  (R. at 10).  The Second 
Circuit distinguished the Gorsuch and Consumers Power cases by 
noting that they were based on deference to the EPA’s position 
compiled by the court from “informal policy statements made and 
consistent litigation positions taken by the EPA over the years, 
primarily in the 1970s and 1980s.”  Catskill Mountains Chapter 
of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 490 
(2d Cir. 2001).  The court went on to point out that “[r]ecent 
Supreme Court cases emphasize that such agency statements do 
not deserve broad deference of the sort accorded by the Gorsuch 
and Consumers Power courts.”  Id. 
 The district court found that Bowman used bulldozers to 
level and push vegetation into windrows, where they were then 
burned.  (R. at 4).  He then dug trenches, filling them with 
vegetation and ash, and drained the leveled field by forming a 
wide ditch.  (R. at 4).  Because Bowman’s activities were nearly 
identical to those in the Fifth Circuit Avoyelles case and very 
similar to the above cases in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and 
Ninth (affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court) Circuits, this Court 
should recognize the overwhelming trend among courts that such 
activities constitute the addition of a pollutant in violation of the 
CWA. 
C. The District Court Misapplied the EPA’s 
“Unitary Navigable Waters” Theory by 
Incorrectly Applying it to Dredged or Fill 
Material that Did Not Already Exist in the 
Waters of the United States. 
  Even ignoring the recent Supreme Court rulings cited by 
the Second Circuit and the reasoning in the above circuits, 
Bowman’s activities – and the similar land clearing activities held 
to be addition in the above cases – are distinguishable from the 
activities in Consumers Power Co.  In Consumers Power Co., live 
fish entered the defendant’s power plant from a reservoir and a 
mixture of live and dead fish were discharged into Lake 
Michigan.  Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 582.  The biological 
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material was already in the waters of the United States 
regardless of its status as live or dead.  Id.  The root and soil 
material that Bowman dug up and moved around were already 
part of those waters, much like the fish.  However, Bowman’s 
land clearing activities also took vegetation that was above the 
soil, not physically dispersed in the waters of the United States, 
and added it to those waters.  (R. at 4).  In other words, the fish in 
Consumers and the roots and soil here were already interspersed 
with the water of the wetland.  Moving those materials around 
may constitute dredging and redeposit, but such would not 
displace more water.  On the other hand, the vegetation that 
previously had been entirely above the water would displace more 
water when added to the wetland, falling squarely within the 
EPA’s definition of addition of fill material by replacing a portion 
of the water with dry material and changing the bottom elevation 
of the water.  33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1). 
 Furthermore, Bowman did not simply change the status of 
the plant material from living to dead, but chemically and 
physically changed the material by burning it into ashes.  (R. at 
4).  The charred remains of plant materials contain “[t]race 
amounts of heavy metals such as lead, cadmium, nickel and 
chromium” and a considerable amount of calcium carbonate, 
which, as ash, “increases soil alkalinity” and can be harmful 
depending on the soil and plant composition.  Rosie B. Lerner, 
Woodash in the Garden, Purdue University (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.hort.purdue.edu/ext/woodash.html.  This ash material 
simply did not exist prior to Bowman’s activities and was clearly 
added to the wetlands, changing the physical and chemical 
characteristics of the wetland.  Consequently, it would run 
counter to the CWA’s purpose of “[r]estoration and maintenance 
of chemical, physical and biological integrity of Nation’s waters” 
for this Court to exempt Bowman from a Section 404 permit.  33 
U.S.C. § 1251(a).  Doing so would strip NUDEP of its ability to 
determine the appropriateness of Bowman’s actions given the 
physical, chemical, and biological complexities of wetlands. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, NUDEP respectfully requests that 
this Court both affirm and reverse its grant of summary 
judgment.  Because NUWF has demonstrated an actual injury, 
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the lower court improperly decided that NUWF does not have 
standing to challenge Bowman’s violation of CWA Section 404.  
The district court properly held under Gwaltney that all of 
Bowman’s violations were wholly in the past for the purposes of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Similarly, in its grant of summary 
judgment, the lower court correctly determined that NUDEP’s 
substantive and procedural prosecution of Bowman met the 
standards of diligent prosecution as to bar NUWF’s suit.  Finally, 
this Court should reverse the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Bowman and find that he violated the CWA by 
adding pollutants to his wetland without a permit. 
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